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Abstract
This paper presents a statistical analysis of past accidents that occurred between
1988 and 2012 reported to the European Commission’s Major Accident Reporting
System (eMARS) focusing on Human and Organizational Factors (HOF). The main
purpose of this work is to quantify the HOF integrated with conventional risk
assessment approaches and to provide future guidelines to relevant standards and
current best practices.
The accident analysis results are further used to quantify the HOF assessment based
on the probabilistic Rasch model. A new approach, Method for Error Deduction and
Incident Analysis (MEDIA) is proposed which can be used with Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) studies for chemical process industry.
Keywords: Human and organizational factor, accident investigation, chemical
process industry, quantitative risk assessment, HAZID identification.

1

Introduction

The human and organizational factors (HOF) have a very important role to maintain
the integrity of operations and equipments in chemical process industry. Nivolianitou
et al. (2006) have concluded after performing an accident investigation of major
accidents reported to European major accident reporting system (MARS/eMARS)
that, 40% of the major accidents have an immediate cause related to human factors.
Furthermore, Bello and Colombari (1980) also highlighted after performing a survey
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that at least 40% of total abnormal events during industrial activities are caused by the
human factors. OGP (2010) also strengthen the notion of HOF by claiming that
human factor aspects during normal and maintenance operations account for around
30% of loss of containment (LOC) events.
1.1

Overview of Human Reliability Methods

It has been reported by Alvarenga et al. (2014) that human reliability analysis (HRA)
in general lacks a human reliability database. While, Lees’ (2012) has pointed out that
large number of human error data points are collected from nuclear industry.
A number of human reliability methods already existed, some of these methods are
reported in Table I.
Table I: Review of some of the existing human factor methods
Method
Predictive Human Error
Analysis (PHEA)
Tecnica Emiprica Stima
Errori Operatori
(TESEO)
System for Predictive
Error Analysis and
Reduction (SPEAR)
Techniques for Human
Error Rate Prediction
(THERP)
Standardized Plant
Analysis Risk-Human
Reliability Analysis
(SPAR-H)
Human Error Analysis
and Reduction Technique
(HEART)

Domain

Qualitative/
Quantitative

References

Chemical

Qualitative

Embrey (1992), Baber and Stanton
(1996)

Chemical

Quantitative

Bello and Colombari (1980)

Chemical

Qualitative

CCPS (1994), sited in Lees’ and
Stanton et al. (2005)

Nuclear

Quantitative

Swain and Guttmann (1983)

Nuclear

Quantitative

Gertman et al. (2005)

Nuclear

Quantitative

Williams (1986)

The PHEA method has adopted the error classification against the behavioural
taxonomy. While, TESEO was developed to quantify the reliability of control room
operator based on five parameters. The SPEAR method uses the error classification
initially developed in PHEA but also includes the affect of performance shaping
factors (PSF). The THERP was the first systematic approach for HRA which can
quantify HRA by using an event tree structure, which can also provide the
dependency among tasks and the affect of PSF. The SPAR-H method provides the
nominal human probability for “operational” and “diagnostic” tasks that are 1×10ˉ3
and 1×10ˉ2, respectively. The SPAR-H method provides both +ve and -ve affect of
PSF on human reliability. However, the use of scale and PSF levels in SPAR-H lacks
the justification and validation as also pointed out by Laumann and Rasmussen
(2015), who have tried to adjust the SPAR-H PSF levels for chemical industry based
on expert’s opinion. The HEART by Williams (1986) quantifies the human reliability
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for nine different generic tasks and considers the affect of error producing conditions
(EPCs) by applying the relevant multipliers.
In this work, emphasis was done to perform the HOF assessment integrated with
major risk assessment/management techniques in order to improve the overall plant’s
safety and to make the risk management procedure more efficient and cost effective.
Therefore, some of the risk assessment/management techniques are briefly
highlighted in the following section.
1.2

Major Risk Assessment/ Management Techniques

There are number of techniques that are widely used in chemical process industry to
evaluate and manage risk during any phase of a project’s life time. Some of these
techniques are highlighted in Table II with associated standards or guidelines.
Table II: Review of risk assessment/ management techniques
Method
Hazard Identification
(HAZID)
Hazard and Operability
(HAZOP) study
Quantitative Risk Assessemnt
(QRA)
Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
assessment
Layer of Protection Analysis
(LOPA) (also called barrier
analysis)

Qualitative/
Quantitative

Relevant Standards/ Engineering Guidelines

Qualitative

ISO 17776 (2000)

Qualitative

IEC 31010 (2009), IEC 61882 (2001)

Quantitative

CCPS (2000), Purple-Book (2005), Perry and
Green (1997)

Semiqualitative

IEC 61511 (2003)

Quantitative

IEC 31010 (2009)

The HAZID is a technique for the identification of all significant hazards associated
with a particular activity under consideration, ISO (2000). The International standard
ISO (2000) provides checklists to identify the potential hazards. The table C. 8 in the
standard provides checklists for hazard identification during operations, which can be
modified based on current work. The HAZOP study uses guidewords to identify the
possible deviations from operations. A QRA is a methodology for determining the
risk of the use, handling, transport and storage of dangerous substances. (Purple
Book, 2005). The results from a QRA are provided in the form of a safety report to
demonstrate if calculated risk from an establishment is in acceptable zone. The
procedures to determine whether a safety report has to be made are provided in the
EU Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU) as also mentioned in the Purple Book (2005).
The SIL assessment defines the level of integrity required by a safety instrumented
function (SIF) to prevent/mitigate the hazardous event. While, during the LOPA
analysis it can be determined if there are sufficient measures to prevent or mitigate a
risk. However, the main use of LOPA is to provide the specification of independent
protection layers (IPLs) and SIL (SIL levels) for instrumented systems as describes in
standard IEC 61511 and also mentioned in standard IEC 31010. A LOPA study can
also be used to allocate risk reduction resources effectively by analysing the risk
reduction (IEC 31010). A LOPA can help to identify the most critical layers to spend
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further resources and time (IEC 31010). The Figure 1 depicts the safety layers
concept which is normally used for risk reduction in chemical process industry.
1.3

Integration of Human and Organizational Factors

A number of attempts have been made in the past to integrate the HOF aspects with
the risk assessment techniques. For example, Øien (2001) has provided the
organizational risk influence model (ORIM) to estimate the impact of organizational
factors on the risk as compliment to QRA studies. Barrier and operational risk
analysis of hydrocarbons release (BORA-Release) method was developed to calculate
the establishment’s specific conditions of technical, human, operational and
organizational influencing factors and their impact on the barrier’s performance that
are established to prevent the hydrocarbon release as illustrated by Aven et al. (2006).
The ω-factor approach has been developed by Mosleh et al (1997) to quantify the
affect of sub-organizational attributes on equipment’s reliability and on operator’s
performance. This model has used the concept of inherent failure characteristics and
characteristics induced by organizational factors for both equipment and operator.
The I-Risk approach quantify the affect of the management/organizational factors to
QRA risk calculations by performing an audit. The organizational factors are assessed
according to provided weights and ratings as proposed by Papazogloua et al. (2003).

Figure 1. Risk reduction method, adapted from IEC 61511-3 (2003) p. 10

In another attempt to integrate the HOF, SchÖnbeck et al. (2010) has proposed a new
approach to adjust the design values of safety integrity levels by considering the
operational affect of the HOF, which can adversely impact the design risk reduction
expressed as safety integrity levels. In this work, SchÖnbeck et al. (2010) has
identified eight safety influencing factors with a potential to influence the
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performance of safety instrumented functions. Therefore, by providing weights and
rating to these factors operational SIL can be obtained from design SIL.
In order to provide an integration of HOF with current risk assessment techniques, it
has been decided to learn from past accidents, that can also provide the necessary data
required to quantify a HOF analysis.
1.4

Learning from Past Accidents

The past accidents can be used to learn lessons retrospectively and to apply the
lessons learned in a prospective manner. The International standard also illustrates to
use the historical data and to predict the probability of occurrence of a failure in the
future (IEC 31010:2009).
During this work, historical data from the European Commission’s major accident
reporting system (eMARS) has been analysed for past accidents occurring from 1988
to 2012. The purpose of eMARS is to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned from
accidents and near misses involving dangerous substances to improve the chemical
accident prevention and mitigation of potential consequences (eMARS, 2014). It is
obligatory for the European Union (EU) Member States to report major accidents to
eMARS if the threshold of an event meets the criteria established in annex VI of the
Seveso III Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU). Prior to Seveso III Directive, same
practice was followed due to preceding Directives. The criteria to notify an accident
is based on discharge amount of a dangerous substance listed in annex I of the
Directive for lower and upper-tier establishments and also based on the consequences
as a result of an accident.

2

Accident Analysis

The causal factors to accidents have been identified based on a subjective judgment.
However, in order to ensure the consistency throughout the analysis, taxonomies for
human and organizational factors were developed as illustrated in Table III. The main
rationale behind the selection of these taxonomies are:
1.
2.

Taxonomies should be quantifiable based on information present in eMARS
accident reports.
Taxonomies should cover as much as possible all failures attributes as observed
during the preliminary analysis of accidents.

The human factor behavioural/action taxonomy is slighted modified compared to
PHEA taxonomy to cover different types of human/ operators actions. While,
organizational factor taxonomy is modified from the taxonomy proposed by Øien
(2001) to include the main organizational influencing factors.
The accidents have been analysed according to modified Swiss cheese models which
can provide a distinction according to initiating cause (i.e. technical or human) to an
accident and subsequent diagnostic/preventive layers (i.e. technical or human). The
Swiss cheese mode was proposed by James Reason, which among others can be
found in Reason (2008). During the preliminary analysis of accidents, it has been
observed that accidents occurred frequently due to the absence or malfunctioning of a
5

Proceedings of the 49th ESReDA Seminar, Brussels, Belgium, October 29-30, 2015

subsequent diagnostic/preventive layer. Therefore, modified Swiss cheese models are
considered in this work to get a better understanding of accident’s evolution in time.
Further information about accident models and use of modified Swiss cheese models
can be found in Ahmad and Pontiggia (2015).
Table III: Taxonomies and considered parameters
Human factor taxonomy
1. Monitoring equipment from field
(M)
2. Monitoring/ operating equipments
from control room (A)
3. Communication (C)
4. Manual tasks on-field (F)
5. Reporting (R)

2.1

Organizational factor
taxonomy
1. Training (TO)
2. Design (DO)
3. Procedures (PO)
4. Management (MO)
5. Safety culture (SO)

Equipment
involved
1. Pipework
2. Vessel
3. In-line
equipment

Type of
hazard
1. Flammable
2. Toxic
3. Both

Results of Accident Analysis

An accident analysis has been performed for accidents occurred from 1988 to 2012
across seven industry types that typically are considered under the umbrella of
chemical process industry as shown in Figure 2. A total 438 accidents have been
analysed of which 197 accidents involved human or organizational characteristics
during the accident.

LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution

1
1

Chemical installations - ammonia

2
2
6
6

Production of basic organic chemicals

8

Power supply and distribution

17
20

Wholesale and retail storage and distribution
(excluding LPG)

58
61

Petrochemical / Oil Refineries

136
99

General chemical manufacture (excluding H2,
SOx, NOx, F2, Cl, NH3 & CO)
0

50

100

Caused by HOF

218
150

200

250

Total accidents

Figure 2. Total accidents versus accidents caused by HOF (1988-2012)

In order to compare the trend of total accidents and accidents caused by HOF. The
time period 1988-2010 was divided into two halves as shown in Figure 3. The %age
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of accidents caused by HOF has increased from 43% to 47% during the period 20002012. While, a decrease trend of total number of accidents was observed in the
second half. The decreased trend of accidents could be due to the improved design
and control of plants, which also adds more complexity to the operations. The added
complexity can possibilily explain the increased trend of accidents due to HOF.
During this analysis, it was observed that contractor’s operations are very critical and
about 15% of total accidents were occurred when contractors were responsible for
certain type of operations, mainly during maintenance activities. The accidents were
also observed according to plant’s operating condition when accident actually
occurred or when an abnormality was induced into the system as identified in postaccident investigations.

250
200
150

Total accidents
Caused by HOF

100
50

0
1988-2000

2000-2012

Figure 3. Comparison of total accidents and caused by HOF

The Figure 4 shows the distribution of accidents in plant’s different operational stages
and when among other causes contractor’s operation was also a cause to the accident.

2

Shut-down

6
0

Start-up

16
21

Maintenance

51

7

Normal operating conditions

124
0

20

40

Accidents involving Contractor

60

80

100

120

140

Accidents (HOF)

Figure 4. Accidents involving contractor in plant’s different operational stages
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The Figure 5 illustrates the type of equipment involved during the accident and
corresponding initiating cause to an accident. The use of modified Swiss cheese
models can help to structure the initiating causes into three main classes. The three
main classes have been identified as follows:
1.
2.
3.

Human
Technical
Technical + human

Only those technical caused accidents are considered in which organizational
attributes were present.

Technical+
Human

In-line equipment
Technical

Vessel
Pipework

Human
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Figure 5. Comparison of initiating causes and type of equipment

In Figure 5, 8% of the analysed accidents did not provide enough information to
identify the initiating causes to an accident or those accidents exhibit more complex
situation. Therefore, those accidents are excluded from this comparison. Similarly,
3% of analysed accident did not provide information about the involved equipments
or the observed accident situation is too complex to identify the main involved
equipment. However, “vessel” equipment is involved in most of the accidents
irrelevant of initiating cause to the accident (i.e. 40%). These operations mainly
involved human activities related to cleaning/maintenance of vessels and mostly
carried out by the contractors.
2.2

Affect of Organizational Factors

The organizational factors which are reported in Table III have been observed for
their influence on operator’s actions. If it is assumed, that situation during an accident
is comparable to situation during normal operations with respect to organizational
influence on human/ operator actions. In this case analysed accidents can provide
estimates of the average comparative influence of organizational factors on human
actions. However, it is reasonably possible that for some accidents more than one
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organizational factor are involved, therefore Table IV shows the normalized affect of
different organizational factors on human/operator action types.
Table IV: Influencing affect of organizational factors on different action types
PSFs

Organizational factors**

Main contributing factors

Type of layer

Operational
layer

Diagnostic or
preventive
layer

Failures*
Technical
M
A
C
F
R
Technical
M
A
F

Training

Design

Procedures

Management

0.11
0.25
0.14
0.44
0.21
0.13
0.30
0.30
0.29

0.25
0.42
0.29
0.11
0.20
0.50
0.10
0.10
-

0.24
0.25
0.29
0.44
0.37
0.13
0.30
0.50
0.57

0.38
0.29
0.18
1
0.25
0.10
0.10
0.14

Safety
culture
0.20
-

* Taxonomy from Table III. ** Only those values are reported with influencing affect ≥ 10%.

Therefore, aforementioned table can provide the influencing affect of different
organizational factor on different failure types (i.e. action types). Since human
taxonomy is behavioural/action based taxonomy so by assuming that organizational
influencing can vary among different action types, Table IV can provide weights of
organizational factors on the human actions. A set of checklists have been developed
during the accident analysis by identify the specific causes for each factor. The
checklists have helped to remain consistent throughout the analysis and can also
provide the future guidelines to avoid recurrences of same causes by analysing them
prospectively.

3

Quantification of Human Error Probability - Probabilistic Rasch
Model

Quantification of human error probabilities (HEPs) from past accidents require some
further assumptions due to lack of available data and validation of available data. This
challenge has also been identified by Sträter (2000) who has tried to obtain the HEP
from the observed frequencies against the THERP database. Furthermore, Sträter
(2000) argued that operational data is always reported by a certain threshold as shown
by eq. (1). Therefore, only limited frequencies can be obtained from operational
experience or from past accidents. In present work, the reporting thresholds are
indicated by Seveso Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU).
(1)
The Figure 6 illustrates the observed error frequencies against different actions types.
The total number of observed instances were 172, when there was some kind of
human (i.e. operator) error caused the accident.
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In order to compare the obtained frequencies from accidents to existing database (e.g.
THERP), Sträter (2000) argued that THERP database from Swain and Guttmann
(1983) provides mostly values for rule-based behaviour or associated errors.
Therefore, one can assume that for all actions, one would have to get roughly
identical basic totalities of requirements. Since, rule-based behaviour idea is more
connected to acquaintance of operator to an action of type i (i.e. frequency of use).
Moreover, after comparing the assumptions of standard logarithmic distribution (used
for THERP values) with the practical operational experience, Sträter (2000) has
justified to compare the observed frequencies with THERP.

Diagnostic: F

Diagnostic: A
Diagnostic: M
Reporting (R)

Manual tasks on-field (F)
Communication (C)
Control room action/monitoring (A)
Monitoring (M)
0
ni'

20

40

Inherent human error frequencies

60

80

100

120

Total observed frequencies

Figure 6. Absolute and relative frequencies against different action types

The concept of inherent human error and error caused by organizational factors has
been used in this work as also used in ω-factor approach Mosleh et al. (1997). The
relative frequencies for an action type (i.e. ) is calculated according to eq. (2).
(2)
Whereas:
M Total number of observed accidents
mi Number of accidents corresponding to ith action type (i.e. observed frequencies)
ni
Number of accidents with inherent human failures corresponding to ith action
type
In order to make the numerical adjustments to observed frequencies, calibration of
frequencies was proposed by Sträter (2000) and probabilistic model according to
Rasch has provided the maximum numerical agreement within THERP uncertainty
bounds.
The Rasch model assumes that observed values and true values of a property are
interrelated via a item characteristic curve (monotonously rising function) Rasch,
(1960). Since, Rasch model has been already modified and used by Sträter (2000).
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Therefore, in this work it has been decided to use the Rasch model to obtain the
nominal HEPs from observed frequencies as done in the CAHR, Sträter (2000).
3.1

The Rasch Model

The modified Rasch model proposed by Sträter (2000) is provided by eq. (3)
(3)
Whereas:
n’i
Relative frequency of ith action type
μ
Mean value
sn
Deviation, determined by iterations (condition which provides the maximum
agreement with the THERP values). (Sn ≈ 5.41)
Hence, by using the least square method and to verify if maximum predicted values
from the Rasch model are within the uncertainty bounds of THERP values, HEPs are
obtained for each action type.
The Figure 7 shows the THERP values for each action type and the predicted values
by Rasch model on logarithmic and normal scale against the relative frequency axis.
1.00E+00

1.00E+00
0

25

50

75

100 125 150

9.00E-01
8.00E-01

1.00E-02
1.00E-03
Rasch

1.00E-04

THERP

1.00E-05

7.00E-01
6.00E-01
5.00E-01

Rasch

4.00E-01

THERP

3.00E-01
2.00E-01
1.00E-01

1.00E-06
1.00E-07

HEP, normal scale

HEP, logarithmic scale

1.00E-01

0.00E+00
0
Relative frequency of an action type n'

25 50 75 100 125 150
Relative frequency of an action type n'

Figure 7. Rasch model prediction against THERP values

The Figure 8 illustrates a comparison of HEPs from THERP and the obtained HEPs
from accident analysis for each action type. It can be observed that manual on-field
operations (F) have an increased HEP compare to other action/error types, this is due
to the fact that manual on-field operational errors have been observed in a higher
frequency compare to other actions types. On the other hand, inherent control room
actions (A) errors have been observed in fewer numbers, therefore HEP against this
action type shows a decreased trend. This can also be explained by the division
between industry domains (i.e. nuclear and chemical process), since THERP database
was developed mainly for nuclear industry and accident analysis in this scope of work
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has been performed in chemical process industry. Therefore, it can also be express
that this analysis makes numerical adjustments to THERP HEPs against the observed
failure events from chemical process industry.

2.00E-02
1.50E-02
1.00E-02
5.00E-03
0.00E+00

THERP
RASCH

5.00E-01
4.50E-01
4.00E-01
3.50E-01
3.00E-01
2.50E-01
2.00E-01
1.50E-01
1.00E-01
5.00E-02
0.00E+00

THERP
RASCH

Diagnostic: M Diagnostic: A Diagnostic: F

Figure 8. Comparison of predicted HEPs of Rasch model and THERP HEPs (operational & diagnostic
layer)

4

New Methodology: Method for Error Deduction and Incident
Analysis (MEDIA)

The Figure 9 illustrates the framework of new proposed method, method for error
deduction and incident analysis (MEDIA). In MEDIA, all the organizational PSF can
be rated on a likert scale by an analyst using the provided checklists by analysing the
extent to which the considered attributes are embedded in a specific plant. An
example of these checklists has been provided in Ahmad et al. (2015). The combined
affect of PSF for an action type can be calculated by using eq. (4).
(4)
Whereas:
Weight of nth PSF, from (Table IV)
Rating of nth PSF
The critical human interventions can be identified from process and instrumentation
diagrams (P&IDs), HAZOP output and other relevant studies. A separate set of
checklists has been developed for each of the human action types. The obtained
nominal HEPs from the Rasch model have been changed to HEPs by using the
SPAR-H method according to eq. (5) as mentioned in Gertman et al. (2005, p.56).
(5)
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The criticality of an action failure is considered by using the concept of safety layers.
It has been observed that whenever failure of an action corresponds to a higher safety
layer the consequences of failure are also severe, mainly due to possible absence of
subsequent safety layers. For example, if monitoring of an alarm fails for an event
and event has analysed to be credible during risk assessment, there should be
subsequent safety layer (e.g. double alarms, SIFs etc). Assuming that subsequence
layers will work (when required), these layers have potential to bring system back
under safe conditions.

Advanced HOF assessment models
(for that isolatable section)

option 2

Yes

Treatment?

Option 1

Move to next
isolatable section

No

Is risk
acceptable?

RiskIndex
(for isolatble section)

Associated safety layer

Decrease

(i.e. 1-4, Fig 1)

HEP estimation
(SPAR-H)

Frequency of action

Decrease

(e.g. per year)

Identify critical human actions
for each taxonomy class in an
isolatable section (use of provide
checklists)

PSFCombined

To
Do
PSFs

Improve

P0
Mo
So

Scale (rn):
1,2,3,.....10 (use of provided checklists)

Figure 9. Framework of method for error deduction and incident analysis (MEDIA)
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On the other hand, if a human failure occurs in a higher safety layers (e.g.
maintenance of PSVs or proof testing of SISs) and not detected in-time. In this case,
due to possible absence of subsequent layers, human failure can lead to much severe
consequences.
Meanwhile, frequency of human interventions for a specific time period is also
considered as shown in Figure 9. The obtained risk index for a specific isolable
section can reduce by improving the PSF quality, by decreasing the frequency of
operations or by decreasing the associated safety layer. The associated safety layer
can also be decrease by providing an addition manual supervision. It has been
observed that lack of supervision especially during contractor’s operations was one of
the main causes of accidents.

5

Discussion

The past accidents can provide the required data for quantification of human factors
and to provide estimates of organizational influence on operations. However,
estimates are based on certain assumptions. But, giving the fact of inadequacy of
existing data and its validation to quantify the HOF especially in chemical process
industry, this work can provide estimates of HOF quantification. These estimates can
also be used in other calculation methods (e.g. FTA, etc).
The new proposed methodology (i.e. MEDIA) can provide an indication about the
critical sections in a plant with respect to HOF, where more resources and times
should be spend. Since checklists are based on past accident events, therefore
considered attributes can provide more relevant aspects to be improved in order to
improve the overall plant situation. However, MEDIA cannot account for the internal
human PSF and time stress, therefore based on initial indication further analyse can
be followed by using more advanced human reliability and cognitive methods.
Alternatively, the checklists can also be used during the HAZID analysis according to
the guidelines provided by ISO (2000). A case study of MEDIA is being carried out
for a gas treatment plant. An immediate validation of HOF data is difficult to carry
out through operational experience. However, the obtained HEPs are comparable with
already existed HF data.
The future work can be focused to provide rating of organizational attributes by using
key performance indicators (KPIs). The aspect of using KPIs is considered to be more
practical than sheer ratings since most of the industries observe and maintain their
KPIs database.
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